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Abstract. The standard view in natural language semantics is that quantifiers denote relations
between sets. Psychological research, however, has shown that quantified statements often convey
finer-grained information that is not encoded in their set-theoretic definitions. We investigate the
relationship between these meaning aspects on the basis of two experiments.
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1. The interpretation of quantifiers
The interpretation of quantifiers has been investigated from a range of perspectives. The standard
view in natural language semantics is that quantifiers denote relations between sets (e.g., Barwise
and Cooper 1981; Keenan and Stavi 1986; Montague 1973). For example, ‘All A are B’ is true iff
the set of A is a subset of the set of B, ‘Some A are B’ is true iff the intersection between the set
of A and the set of B is nonempty, and ‘Most A are B’ is true iff the number of A that are B is
greater than the number of A that are not B. Formally, using the italic form of a term to refer to its
extension:
‘All A are B’ is true iff A⊆ B
‘Some A are B’ is true iff A∩B 6= /0
‘Most A are B’ is true iff |A∩B|> |A−B|
These set-theoretic definitions assign binary truth values: quantified sentences are either true or
false in a situation. No finer-grained differences between situations are thus expected.
Psychological research, however, suggests that quantified statements often convey finer-grained
information than what is encoded in their set-theoretic definitions. To illustrate, Newstead et al.
(1987) asked participants to fill in the blanks in sentences like the following, where the quantifier
Q and the total set size n were varied between items:
If Q of a group of n people are male, then people are male.
In addition, Newstead et al. asked participants what they would expect to be the minimum and
maximum number of people that satisfied the predicate given the truth of the antecedent. For
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statements where the total set size was 60, Newstead et al. found the following mean estimates (in
%) for the previously mentioned quantifiers ‘all’, ‘some’, and ‘most’:
Min Mean Max
All 100 100 100
Some 17 33 45
Most 66 83 90
The results for ‘all’ are in line with its set-theoretic definition: ‘All people are male’ implies that
there are no females. The response ranges for ‘some’ and ‘most’, however, are much smaller than
suggested by their set-theoretic definitions. For example, even though, according to its set-theoretic
definition, ‘Some people are male’ is true whenever more than one person is male, participants infer
from this statement that between 17% and 45% people are male. Further research has shown that
the precise estimates are influenced by extralinguistic factors, such as:
• Total set size. Newstead et al. (1987) found for some quantifiers that the estimated number of
people that satisfies the predicate depends on the total set size. An example is ‘Some people
are male’: if there are just twelve people, participants estimate that 37% of them are male,
whereas in a situation with ten thousand people their estimation drops to about 27%.
• World knowledge. Estimates for statements of the form ‘Q A are B’ depend on the intuitive
likelihood that As are B: they will be higher for statements like ‘Q people find Miss Sweden
attractive’ than for statements like ‘Q earthquakes occurred in California in 1951’ (e.g.,
Moxey and Sanford 1993; Pepper and Prytulak 1974).
• Audience design. Yildirim et al. (2013) provide evidence that listeners tailor their interpre-
tation of quantified statements to the idiosyncracies of the speaker. If a speaker consistently
refers to situations where half of the A are B with ‘Some A are B’ instead of ‘Many A are
B’, listeners take this information into account in their estimates.
• Alternatives. Chase (1969) found that estimates for quantified statements depend on the
alternative expressions that feature in the experiment. He asked participants to rate the like-
lihood of an event on a five-point scale. In one condition, these events were described by
means of high-frequency quantifiers (e.g., ‘very often’, ‘usually’); in the other condition, by
means of low-frequency quantifiers (e.g., ‘seldom’, ‘occasionally’). In many cases, Chase
found that the mean likelihood ratings in these conditions were statistically indistinguish-
able.
These findings can be modelled in various ways. Some authors have proposed that quantifiers de-
note probability distributions over situations. In other words, ‘Q A are B’ denotes a function from
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situations to numerical values that sum to one (e.g., Yildirim et al., 2013). However, there are a
number of issues with this proposal. First, it is not immediately obvious what the numerical values
represent. Suppose that the function assigns a value p to a particular situation. One interpretation
is that this means that the listener believes that the likelihood of this situation is p. Another inter-
pretation is that the likelihood that a listener believes this situation is the one the speaker had in
mind is p. Yet another interpretation is that the listener believes that the speaker believes that the
likelihood of that situation is p. For our current purposes, the differences between these proposals
are immaterial but it is an issue that stands in need of further analysis. A more pressing problem
with the probabilistic account is that for most quantifiers it presupposes knowledge about the size
of the quantifier domain. Consider the sentence ‘Some A are B’. In order to assign a probability
value to a situation with, for example, five As that are B, it will be necessary to know how many
As there are in total: the value will be much higher in a situation with ten As than in a situation
with ten thousand As. This indeterminacy goes against the intuition that it is perfectly possible to
interpret quantified statements without having knowledge about the size of the quantifier domain.
In order to avoid this issue, we will model the finer-grained interpretation of quantified statements
by assigning them functions from situations to typicality values (Rosch, 1975). This is a more
general approach than the probabilistic account because it does not require that the numerical
values sum to one. It is therefore possible to assign a definite value to a situation even it the total
set size is unknown. The numerical values represent the “typicality” of a situation with respect
to the quantified statement. In the next section, we explain the notion of typicality in some more
detail. Typicality values can be converted to probability values by dividing them by the sum of the
typicality values, which will only be possible if information about the total set size is available.
What is the relationship between typicality structure and the set-theoretic truth definitions proposed
by natural language semanticists? Are these meaning aspects disparate, or are they reflections of
one underlying dimension? Are set-theoretic definitions of quantifiers still needed in light of the
findings from psychological experiments? In Section 4, we address these questions on the basis of
the results of two experiments that will be discussed in Section 3. This investigation follows the
lead of McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978), who inquired into the interpretation of nouns. In the
next section, we consider their arguments in some detail.
2. McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978)
Nouns like ‘bird’ and ‘furniture’ refer to categories. According to the classical view, already
propagated by Socrates in Plato’s Statesman and later popularised by Aristotle, categories are sets
of objects that fulfill a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, ‘bird’ refers to
the set of individuals that are warm-blooded and egg-laying vertebrates with feathers and wings.
According to this account, all individuals are either birds or nonbirds.
Psychological research, however, suggests that listeners often make finer-grained distinctions be-
tween objects than the binary distinction imposed by the classical definition of a category. For
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example, Rosch (1975) found that participants consider sparrows to be more typical birds than
penguins or chickens. Some authors have argued that these typicality judgements indicate that
category membership itself is a matter of degree: sparrows are birds to a greater degree than are
penguins or chickens (e.g., Lakoff 1973). Other authors, however, have criticised this view (e.g.,
Kamp and Partee 1995).
What is the relationship between typicality judgements and category membership? Do listeners
have access to classical definitions for categories denoted by nouns like ‘bird’ and ‘furniture’?
To address these questions, McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) probed participants for typicality
judgements and category membership judgements for a range of categories and objects.
Table 1 provides a sample of the results for the categories denoted by ‘bird’ and ‘furniture’. In
both cases, the average typicality values line up along a continuum between the two extremes.
In the case of ‘furniture’, the percentages of positive responses in the category membership task
also form such a continuum. In the case of ‘bird’, by contrast, almost all percentages of positive
responses are close to the extremes of 0 and 100. Hence, there was more agreement about category
membership for ‘bird’ than for ‘furniture’.
Object τ ς Object τ ς
Bird Furniture
Robin 10.00 100 Chair 9.95 100
Eagle 9.58 100 Table 9.83 100
Partridge 8.42 100 Bed 9.58 98
Goose 8.29 97 Rug 6.25 48
Condor 8.23 100 Lampshade 5.70 63
Buzzard 8.08 98 Sewing machine 5.32 11
Turkey 7.92 100 Refridgerator 5.07 18
Chicken 7.75 95 Waste basket 4.70 31
Loon 7.43 100 Bookends 4.53 43
Ostrich 7.25 97 Ironing board 4.32 16
Penguin 6.96 92 Pillow 4.12 31
Bat 3.63 17 Electric fan 3.78 13
Flying squirrel 2.63 5 Ashtray 3.45 21
Vampire 2.29 13 Door 2.87 10
Bee 2.04 3 Ceiling 2.03 0
Locust 1.83 9 Fence 1.87 0
Table 1: Sample of the results of the typicality and category membership tasks for the categories denoted by
‘bird’ (left column) and ‘furniture’ (right column) as found by McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978). τ : Average
typicality on a 10-point scale; ς : Percentage of positive responses in the category membership task.
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Do participants have access to a well-defined category for these nouns, or are their category mem-
bership judgements fully determined by typicality differences? In order to answer this question,
we constructed two models predicting proportions of positive responses in the category mem-
bership task: one based on a classical definition and one based on typicality judgements. The
classical model for ‘bird’ assigned 1 to all biological birds and 0 to all other objects. In the case
of ‘furniture’, there was no straightforward criterion for distinguishing category members from
nonmembers. Therefore a cutoff point in the typicality ratings was used: all objects that scored
higher than 5.5 were assigned 1 and all other objects 0. The typicality model was formed by the
normalised typicality ratings. For both nouns, we compared the absolute differences between the
predicted and attested proportions of positive responses in the category membership task by means
of Welch t-tests. In the case of ‘bird’, the classical model provided a better fit than the typicality
model (mean differences of .06 and .17, t(54) = −3.94, p < .001), whereas the converse was the
case for ‘furniture’ (mean differences of .19 and .09, t(34) = 2.48, p= .02).
The results for ‘bird’ are thus in accordance with the classical account of categorisation. For this
noun, judgements of category membership were relatively crisp. This suggest that participants
have access to a well-defined category of birds. The results for ‘furniture’ are in accordance with
the typicality account, since judgements of category membership were better approximated by
typicality judgements than by any classical definition. These observations can be formalised as
follows. Here, ςA(x) is the proportion of participants who indicate that x is an instance of the
category denoted by ‘A’, and τA(x) is the normalised mean typicality rating for x in the category
denoted by ‘A’. These are values in the interval [0, 1]. x ∈ A means that x is a member of the
category denoted by ‘A’ according to its classical definition. This equals a value in the set {0, 1}.
ςBIRD(x) = x ∈ BIRD
ςFURNITURE(x) = τFURNITURE(x)
A further question that stands in need of an explanation is what determines the typicality judge-
ments that McCloskey and Glucksberg found. In the case of ‘bird’, category membership plays
a prominent role in the typicality judgements as well: the difference in mean typicality rating be-
tween the least typical birds (i.e., 6.96 for penguins) and the most typical nonbirds (i.e., 4.96 for
pterodactyls) is much greater than the difference between any other pair of neighbours on the ς -
scale. No such effect is visible in the case of ‘furniture’. In addition, typicality judgements are
often explained in terms of distance from the prototype (e.g., Rosch and Mervis 1975). A proto-
type is an object that is especially representative of a category because it satisfies most or all of the
characteristics that are standardly associated with that category. For example, a prototypical bird
might be an animal that is capable of flight, relatively small, and not too exotic. These observa-
tions can be formalised as follows. Here, dist(x, p) is a measure of the distance between x and the
prototype p. This equals a value in the interval [0, 1]. The resultant typicality values occur in the
interval [-1, 1] and should therefore be normalised to the [0, 1] interval.
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τBIRD(x) = x ∈ BIRD−dist(x, p)
τFURNITURE(x) = dist(x, p)
In order to address the questions we posed at the end of the Introduction, we conducted two experi-
ments analogous to McCloskey and Glucksberg’s to determine and model the relationship between
set-theoretic definitions and typicality structure in the interpretation of quantifiers. To that end, we
gathered and analysed truth value judgements and typicality judgements for quantified statements.
Since sentences refer to situations instead of individuals, we used pictures of situations instead of
words referring to individuals. An example of a trial is shown in Figure 1. The quantifiers that
were included in the experiments are listed in Table 2.
Some of the circles are black
Figure 1: Sample item used in the experiments.
In the first experiment, participants had to indicate on a seven-point scale how well the situation
was described by the statement; in the second experiment, they had to indicate whether the state-
ment was true or false in the depicted situation. One of our goals was to investigate if truth value
judgements are better approximated by set-theoretic definitions or by typicality judgements. The
set-theoretic definitions we used to this end are also listed in Table 2.
Quantifier Definition Quantifier Definition
All A⊆ B Most |A∩B|> |A−B|
Every A⊆ B None A∩B= /0
Few |A∩B|< δ Some A∩B 6= /0
Many |A∩B|> δ Not all A 6⊆ B
More than half |A∩B|> |A−B| Not many |A∩B| ≤ δ
Table 2: Quantifiers used in the experiments and the corresponding set-theoretic definitions.
These definitions are the standard ones from the literature. ‘Few’ and ‘many’ are vague quantifiers.
This implies that their meaning depends on the context. ‘Few A are B’ expresses that the number
of A that are B is surprisingly low. This can be formalised by means of a contextually determined
threshold value δ below which the real number of A that are B is supposed to fall. ‘Many A are
B’ conversely implies that the number of A that are B is surprisingly high, and should therefore
exceed some contextually determined threshold value δ . It turns out that in our experiment, the
value that most participants assigned to δ was 5 for both quantifiers.
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There is one likely complication that warrants some further discussion. It is well known that
truth value judgements are influenced by pragmatic inferences. To illustrate, the truth conditions
of ‘Some A are B’ are compatible with all situations where one or more A is B. Nonetheless,
someone who utters this sentence will often exclude some of these situations by pragmatic means.
This particular utterance carries at least three possible inferences. First, it might implicate that
it is not the case that only one A is B. This inference is triggered by the plural marking on the
subject and verb. Some authors have argued that this plurality inference is pragmatic in nature
(e.g., Spector 2006). Second, the utterance might implicate that it is not the case that all of the
A are B. This is a scalar inference based on the lexical scale 〈some, all〉. By using a weaker
expression on this scale, the speaker implicates that she believes that using the stronger expression
would have caused the utterance to be false. Third, it might implicate that it is not the case that
most of the A are B. This scalar inference is based on the lexical scale 〈some, most〉. Zevakhina
(2012) provides evidence that the ‘not all’ inference is more robust than the ‘not most’ inference.
It has been shown that some participants judge sentences false in situations where their pragmatic
inferences are false (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004). Note that this does not necessarily mean that
these participants consider a sentence like ‘Some A are B’ equally bad in a situation where all of
the A are B as they do in a situation where none of them are, and where the set-theoretic truth
conditions of the sentence are thus violated: Katsos and Bishop (2010) show that most participants
consider the sentence worse in the last-mentioned situation when given the option to distinguish
between degrees of badness. In our experiments, these differences in degrees of badness might
reveal themselves in the typicality judgements.
Most of the quantifiers in our investigation licensed pragmatic inferences. The quantifiers ‘many’,
‘more than half’, and ‘most’ license the inference that not all of the circles are black; the quantifiers
‘few’, ‘not all’, and ‘not many’ license the inference that at least one of the circles is black. Note
that ‘some’ is exceptional in that it carries three potential pragmatic inferences, whereas all of
the other quantifiers have just one possible inference. It seems plausible to suppose that these
pragmatic inferences will have an effect on the results of both experiments. We will discuss this
issue in more detail in the Results section.
3. The experiments
3.1. Participants
We posted surveys for 340 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Only workers with an IP
address in the United States were eligible for participation. In addition, these workers were asked
to indicate their native language. Payment was not contingent on their response to this question.
120 participants provided truth value judgements (mean age: 34; range: 18-61; 68 females). All of
these participants were native speakers of English. 220 participants provided typicality judgements
(mean age: 37; range: 18-70; 135 females). 30 participants provided typicality judgements for the
quantifiers ‘some’ and ‘every’; 20 participants provided typicality judgements for all of the other
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quantifiers. 5 participants provided typicality judgements for more than one quantifier. 11 of the
220 participants in the typicality task were excluded from the analysis because they were not native
speakers of English.
3.2. Materials
Sentences were of the following form:
(1) Q {circle is / of these circles are} black.
Q was instantiated by the quantifiers in Table 2. The corresponding pictures consisted of ten circles
which were either black or white. The distribution of black and white circles was manipulated, thus
creating eleven situation s0, . . . , s10. In a situation sn, n of the circles were black and the remaining
10−n circles were white. An example trial is shown in Figure 1.
Surveys in the truth value judgement task consisted of twenty trials. Each of the ten quantifiers was
instantiated twice with two different pictures. The pictures for one quantifier always differed in at
least three circles. Because there was an uneven number of situations, one of them, s5, occurred
twice as often as the other situations: 40 instead of 20 times. The order of the items was ran-
domised for each participant, making sure that the same quantifier never occurred consecutively.
The truth value judgement task differed from McCloskey and Glucksberg’s who asked participants
to categorise all possible instantiations. We avoided this procedure because it might lead to con-
trastive readings of quantifiers. Intuitively, if ‘some’ receives a contrastive reading, which usually
manifests itself by means of prosodic stress, it excludes ‘all’ by entailment. We wanted to avoid
this potential confound as much as possible.
In the typicality experiment, participants were presented with one quantifier in all eleven situations.
The order of the items was randomised for each participant.
3.3. Procedure
To collect truth value judgements, participants were presented with the following instructions:
In the following survey, we will show you pairs of pictures and sentences. In each
case, we ask you to decide whether or not the sentence gives a correct description of
the picture. If you feel that the sentence is true, check “True”. If not, check “False”.
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We are interested in your spontaneous judgments, so please don’t think too long about
your answers.
In order to collect typicality judgements, participants were presented with the following instruc-
tions (based on the instructions used by Rosch 1975):
This experiment is about how sentences are interpreted. Consider the sentence “This
is a vehicle”. Many people agree that this sentence is a better description of a car
or a motorbike than of a sled or a tractor, even though they are strictly speaking all
vehicles. Below is another example.
This circle is dark.
bad
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
good
In my eyes, the picture is a reasonable instance of the sentence. I can imagine worse
instances (for example a white circle) but I can also imagine better instances (for ex-
ample a black circle). For that reason, I gave a rating that is in between the two
extremes 1 and 7. However, the exact rating is a matter of taste and you might want
to give a higher or lower rating. In this experiment, you will see one sentence with
eleven pictures. For each picture, you have to indicate how well it is described by the
sentence. It doesn’t matter why you think that a sentence is a good or bad description
of a particular picture. Just follow your intuition.
3.4. Results
Figure 2 provides the normalised mean typicality judgements and the proportions of positive re-
sponses in the truth value judgement task. The figure suggests that, in general, typicality judge-
ments were less pronounced than the proportions of positive responses in the truth value judgement
task. Furthermore, the average typicality values were more evenly distributed across the space of
possible answers, whereas the proportions of positive responses in the truth value judgement task
clustered around the extremes of 0 and 1. This suggestion is confirmed by a comparison of the
variances: the variance in normalised typicality ratings was significantly greater than the vari-
ance in the proportions of positive responses in the truth value judgement task (F(109,109) = 1.9,
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p < .001). Both of these observations are captured by the density plot in Figure 3: the modes of
the average typicality values are closer to the center than the modes of the proportions of positive
responses in the truth value judgement task, and there are more values in the middle region of
the space of possible answers in the average typicality values than in the proportions of positive
answers in the truth value judgement task.
All Every Few Many More than half





0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10




Figure 2: Normalised typicality judgements and proportions of positive responses in the truth value judgement
task for ten quantifiers.
One anomalous observation is the proportion of positive responses for ‘some’ in s8 (M = .79). This
proportion is unexpectedly higher than in situations with seven (M = .56) or nine (M = .50) black
circles. The difference, however, is not statistically significant in either case. It is presumably
caused by the between-participants design of the truth value judgement task: s8 was judged by
different participants than s7 and s9. Apparently s8 was judged by more charitable participants
than the other two situations.
Which situations are prototypical of the quantifiers that were investigated? There are at least two
ways of answering this question. The first is to take the situations with the highest mean typicality
judgements. The second is to take the situations that received the highest typicality judgements
from the largest number of participants. For almost all of the quantifiers, these methods lead
to the same prototypes. The sole exception is ‘not all’. For this quantifier, the highest mean
typicality judgement was for s6, whereas s9 was assigned the highest typicality rating by the most
participants. This discrepancy reflects a high degree of disagreement between participants in the
typicality task for this quantifier. Some participants gave the highest rating to s0, some to s9, and
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Figure 3: Density plot of the normalised typicality ratings and proportions of positive responses in the truth value
judgement task.
some to situations inbetween these extremes. Note that a similar lack of agreement is not visible
in the results of the truth value judgement task.
As hypothesised, there is a strong effect of pragmatic inferences on both truth value and typicality
judgements. We compared the results for situations where a pragmatic inference was violated with
the results for the nearest situation where this was not the case. The mean difference between
these situations was higher in the truth value judgement task (M = .46) than in the typicality task
(M = .28). This difference was marginally significant (t(7) = 1.87, one-sided p= .05). Focusing
on the results of the truth value judgement task, the difference was higher for negative quantifiers
(M = .69) than for positive quantifiers (M = .32, t(6) = 2.46, one-sided p = .03). There was no
analogous effect of monotonicity on the effect of pragmatic inferences in the average typicality
judgements.
What factors underlie truth value judgements in this experiment? Based on the discussion in Sec-
tion 2, two possible answers suggest themselves: truth value judgements are determined either by
typicality judgements or by set-theoretic definitions. In order to decide between these two possi-
ble answers, we constructed three models predicting proportions of positive responses in the truth
value judgement task. The first model used the set-theoretic truth definitions given in Table 2 as
predictor variable. The second and third model were based on the normalised mean typicality
ratings. The second model mapped these typicality ratings straight onto proportions of positive
responses in the truth value judgement task. The intuition that underlies this model is that the typ-
icality of an object reflects the likelihood that the sentence is considered true in that situation. The
third model dichotomised the typicality judgements on the basis of a cutoff point. We calculated
that the optimal cutoff point was 4.4. Values below the cutoff point were mapped to 0 and values
above it to 1. According to this model, listeners make truth value judgements by dichotomising
B. van Tiel & B. Geurts Truth and typicality in the interpretation of quantifiers
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 18
Edited by Urtzi Etxeberria, Anamaria Fa˘la˘us¸, Aritz Irurtzun & Bryan Leferman 461
their typicality judgements. Unlike the typicality model, it is not obvious what the rationale behind
the dichotomised model is. Why do listeners dichotomise typicality judgements on the basis of an
apparently arbitrary cut-off point? One possible answer is that this cut-off point reflects whether
the sentence is true according to its set-theoretic definition. But in that case the model draws upon
set-theoretic definitions just like the set-theoretic model. If this model is to be a competitor to the
set-theoretic model, it thus stands in need of a principled motivation.
The mean distances between these three models and the results from the truth value judgement task
are given in Table 3. For the set-theoretic model, the mean distances range from .00 for ‘every’ to
.25 for ‘some’. For the typicality model, the mean distances range from .04 for ‘more than half’
to .27 for ‘not all’. For the dichotomised typicality model, the mean distances range from .00 for
‘every’ to .24 for ‘not all’.
Quantifier Set Typ Dich Quantifier Set Typ Dich
All .01 .22 .10 Most .08 .15 .13
Every .00 .22 .00 None .01 .13 .01
Few .13 .13 .14 Some .25 .18 .23
Many .06 .12 .10 Not all .08 .27 .24
More than half .04 .04 .04 Not many .11 .18 .11
Table 3: Mean difference between the proportions of positive responses in the truth value judgement task and
(i) the set-theoretic definitions in Table 2 (= Set), (ii) the normalised typicality judgements (= Typ), and (iii) the
dichotomised typicality judgements (= Dich)
We compared the distances between these models and the proportions of positive responses in the
truth value judgement task. The mean distance was significantly greater for the typicality model (M
= .16) than for the set-theoretic model (M = .08, t(109) = 3.77, p < .001). It was also significantly
greater for the typicality model than for the dichotomised typicality model (M = .11, t(109) = 2.42,
p = .002). The difference in mean distances between the set-theoretic and dichotomised typicality
models was marginally significant (t(109) = 1.52, one-sided p = .07).
A substantial part of the lack of fit in all of the models is caused by the confounding effect of prag-
matic inferences. Therefore we also used the models to predict a restricted set of the data points
that were not affected by pragmatic inferences. This improved all of the models. We once again
compared the distances between these limited models and the proportions of positive responses
in the truth value judgement task. The mean distance was significantly greater for the typicality
model (M = .15) than for the set-theoretic model (M = .03, t(96) = 8.27, p < .001) and for the
dichotomised typicality model (M = .06, t(96) = 5.01, p < .001). The mean distance for the dich-
tomised typicality model was significantly greater than for the set-theoretic model (t(96) = 1.94,
one-sided p = .03).
Proportions of positive responses in the truth-value judgement task are thus better approximated by
set-theoretic definitions or dichotomised typicality values than by simple typicality values. More-
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over, there is some evidence that the set-theoretic model is more appropriate than the dichotomised
model: it is a marginally better predictor of the proportions of positive responses including data
points that are influenced by pragmatic inferences and a significantly better predictor of the propor-
tions of positive responses excluding those data points. In addition, the dichotomised model lacks
a principled explanation for the use of a seemingly arbitrary cut-off point in the mean typicality
ratings, and the sole plausible motivation seems to invoke set-theoretic truth conditions.
What factors underlie typicality judgements in this experiment? Based on the discussion in Section
2, two possible answers suggest themselves: typicality judgements are determined either by set-
theoretic definitions and distance from the prototype or by distance from the prototype alone.
In order to decide between these possible answers, we constructed two models predicting mean
typicality judgements. The first model included the set-theoretic definitions from Table 2 and
distance from the prototype as predictor variables, whereas the second model included distance
from the prototype alone. Before these models can be operationalised, however, a number of
parameters have to be set. First, what are the prototypes associated with quantified sentences?
Second, how to operationalise distance from the prototype? Third, what is the relative importance
of set-theoretic definitions and distance from the prototype in the first model? We discuss these
issues in turn.
What are the prototypes associated with quantified sentences? As noted before, quantifiers differ
in how unambiguous and salient the prototype is: for quantifiers like ‘every’ and ‘none’, all partici-
pants converged on the same prototype, for quantifiers like ‘some’ and ‘most’, there was an overall
consensus but judgments were not fully unanimous, and for ‘not all’ there was a large amount
of disagreement among participants. The choice of prototype seems to be determined by at least
two factors: set-theoretic truth conditions and competing quantifiers. To start with the first factor,
prototypes are always situations where the sentence is true according to its set-theoretic truth def-
inition. For some quantifiers, however, this still leaves a number of situations to choose from. In
that case, the choice might be influenced by competing quantifiers: a prototypical situation is one
that is maximally distinct from the prototypical situations of competing quantifiers. This criterion
can explain the different choices of prototypes for ‘not all’. Participants who assume that ‘not all’
competes with ‘all’ will consider s0 as the prototype because that situation is maximally distinct
from the prototype for ‘all’. Participants who also took into consideration ‘none’ as a competitor
would opt for a situation with around five black circles. Lastly, participants who also considered
‘not many’ might have converged on a prototype that lies somewhere on the upper end of the scale.
This discussion leaves open some further questions. What determines the choice of competing
quantifiers? Which quantifiers are in principle available as competitors? How do the alternatives
that determine the choice of prototype relate to the alternatives that are involved in the computa-
tion of pragmatic inferences? While we believe these questions are interesting and might warrant
further analysis, we will simply stipulate that the prototypes are the situations that received the
highest mean typicality ratings.
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A second question is how to operationalise distance from the prototype. This question has a
straightforward answer: the distance between a prototypical situation sn containing n black cir-
cles and another situation si equals the absolute difference between n and i.
The final question involves the relative importance of set-theoretic truth conditions and distance
from the prototype in the model that included both of these factors. Because we do not have specific
expectations about these parameters, we simulated them by means of a Monte Carlo procedure.
To this end, we assigned 5,000 random values to both parameters. For each pair of values, we
calculated the predicted typicality values and the correlation between these predicted values and
the attested typicality values. In the optimal situation, the effect of set-theoretic truth conditions
was more than seven times as large as the effect of increasing the distance from the prototype by
one. We therefore weighed the two factors accordingly in the first model.
Figure 4 provides a visual overview of the goodness of fit of both models. The correlation between
the typicality values predicted by the first model containing both set-theoretic definitions and dis-
tance from the prototype, and the attested typicality values was r = .94. The correlation between
the typicality values predicted by the second model consisting of distance from the prototype alone
and the attested typicality values was r = .83. We compared the two models on the basis of the
absolute differences between predicted and attested typicality values. The mean difference was
significantly higher for the second model (M = .21) than for the first model (M = .12, t(109) =
6.53, p < .001). As before, the fit of both models is relatively poor for situations that are excluded
for pragmatic reasons. Excluding those data points from consideration leads to correlations of r =
.96 for the first model and r = .87 for the second one.
What do these results tell us about the questions we posed at the end of the Introduction? What
is the relationship between set-theoretic truth conditions and typicality judgements? Do listeners
have access to set-theoretic definitions of quantified sentences? In the following section, we discuss
these questions on the basis of the foregoing results.
4. General discussion
In the Introduction, we observed that the interpretation of quantified statements is often finer-
grained than what is encoded in their set-theoretic definitions. For example, according to its set-
theoretic truth conditions, the statement ‘Some A are not B’ is true in all situations where not all
of the A are B. But when participants are asked how many A are B given that this statement is true,
Newstead et al. (1987) found that their estimates are much more precise and range between 55%
and 89% of the total number of A.
These findings can be modelled in different ways. Some authors have proposed that quantifiers
denote probability distributions over situations. This proposal, however, presupposes knowledge
about the total set size, whereas it seems possible to interpret quantifiers even in the absence of
this knowledge. The current findings provide a further argument against a probabilistic view on
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Figure 4: Scatterplot with the typicality values predicted by the two models and the typicality judgements found
in the experiment.
quantification. Consider the typicality judgements for the quantifiers ‘all’, ‘every’, and ‘none’.
These steadily decrease with the distance from the prototypical situation, which means that all
situations except for the most distant one received a positive rating. It seems implausible, however,
to conclude from these findings that, for example, that given that ‘All the circles are black’, the
probability of a situation with three black circles is anything other than zero.
In order to avoid these issues, we have modelled the finer-grained interpretation of quantifiers by
assuming that they denote typicality functions. In that case, is it still plausible to suppose that
listeners have access to set-theoretic definitions of quantifiers? The results of our experiments pro-
vide a number of arguments to substantiate the role of set-theoretic definitions in the interpretation
of quantifiers. First, we constructed three models to predict proportions of positive responses in
the truth value judgement task. One model consisted of set-theoretic definitions; the second model
consisted of typicality judgements; and the third model dichotomised these typicality judgements
based on a cutoff point. We found that the absolute deviations from the first model were signifi-
cantly smaller than those from the second model, and marginally smaller than those from the third
model.
These findings demonstrate that the typicality of a situation should not be equated to the likelihood
that the corresponding quantified statement is judged true. The evidence against the view that
truth value judgements are dichotomised typicality judgements, however, was less convincing.
Still, even if we assumed that truth value judgements are dichotomised typicality judgements, it
wouldn’t be clear why this should be so, and set-theoretic definitions would still have to feature in
the explanation of the typicality judgements themselves.
We constructed two models to predict typicality judgements. The first model consisted of set-
theoretic definitions and distance from the prototype, where the former factor was given seven
times as much weight as the latter. The second model consisted of distance from the prototype
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alone. We found that absolute deviations from the first model were significantly smaller than those
from the second model. This finding again indicates that listeners have access to set-theoretic
definitions of quantifiers.
A related argument in favour of the view that set-theoretic definitions feature in the interpretation of
quantified statements is the rarity of disagreement between participants about whether a quantified
statement was true or false. More precisely, aside from situations where pragmatic inferences
play a role, there were four proportions of positive responses in the range between 0.1 and 0.9.
Three of these involved the s5 situation for the proportional quantifiers ‘most’, ‘many’, and ‘few’,
and one involved the s4 situation for ‘many’. These three quantifiers all involve some kind of
threshold value. So a possible explanation for these anomalous observations is that participants
might have disagreed about the exact value of this threshold. By contrast, there was a substantial
amount of disagreement in the typicality judgements for all quantifiers. If truth value judgements
were calculated on the basis of typicality judgements, we would have expected a similar amount
of disagreement in both of these measures.
Furthermore, it might be argued that set-theoretic definitions are necessary to account for the inter-
pretation of embedded quantifiers. For example, it seems inevitable to suppose that the interpreta-
tion of ‘not all’ is a function of the interpretation of ‘all’. This relationship is apparent in the truth
value judgements but not in the typicality judgements: the correlation between the proportions of
positive responses in the truth value judgements task for ‘all’ and ‘not all’ is -.88 and, if the effect
of the pragmatic inference for ‘not all’ is taken into account, -.98. This strength of association
is absent in the typicality judgements: the correlation between typicality judgements for ‘all’ and
‘not all’ is -.47. (Note, however, that the typicality structure of ‘many’ does provide a reliable fit
to the typicality structure of ‘not many’.)
We have thus provided a number of arguments in favour of the view that listeners have access
to set-theoretic interpretations of quantifiers. One apparent exception to this rule is ‘some’. The
set-theoretic definition for this quantifier was a poor fit to the actual truth value judgements. Truth
value judgements were equivocal for all situations other than those with zero black circles, where
it was judged false by all participants, and those with two, three, or four black circles, where
it was judged true by all or almost all participants. As noted, however, ‘some’ is exceptional
in that it licenses three pragmatic inferences. Surprisingly, participants also make distinctions
between situations that do not correspond to a pragmatic inference: for example, the statements
was judged true by more participants in s6 than in s9, even though both situations violate the
pragmatic inference that not most of the circles are black. Apparently, then, distance from the
prototype also influences judgements about what to do with statements that violate a pragmatic
inference: the likelihood that a sentence is judged false in such a situation depends on how salient
its violation is.
Aside from demonstrating the role of set-theoretic definitions in the interpretation of quantifiers, we
have provided a model for truth value and typicality judgements for quantified statements based on
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set-theoretic definitions, distance from the prototype, and pragmatic inferences. The interpretation
of quantifiers is thus a multidimensional phenomenon that warrants further investigation.
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